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This essay connects Antonio Gramsci’s expanded concept of Marxian ideology to his training in linguistics 
and, broadly understood, philosophy of language in order to advance a hypothesis regarding Gramsci’s views on 
literary criticism and aesthetic judgment. This hypothesis can be summed up in the following way: aesthetic 
judgment, including literary criticism, maintains a unity of form and content while rejecting facile attempts to 
reduce the global meaning of a “political” work of art to its ideological content, where ideology is understood in 
the sense of a series of theoretical propositions about the world, which reside in the realm of traditional 
Marxist superstructure. As a result, there is no recourse to either a scientific objectivity or a relativistic 
emphasis on subjectivity in the evaluation of works of art; instead, priority is given to an immanent, contextual 
interpretation of works of literature and culture. Such a methodology is intimately related to Gramsci’s 
reworked concept of ideology and therefore deserves further consideration.  
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Throughout the Quaderni del carcere, expanding on ideas presented in his 
pre-prison writings, Antonio Gramsci develops a concept of “ideology” that 
ties the notion to several other concepts – folklore, religion, common sense, 
and philosophy – in a way that reworks the received Marxian understanding 
of ideology most present in his contemporary moment. In doing so, he 
draws our attention to the power structures that undergird cultural 
phenomena, from the local and popular to national and international 
regulative concepts of high culture, in a way that places them in reciprocal 
relation to material and economic conditions. Such a reworking of the 
notion of “ideology” offers a special role to the intellectual, now understood 
in a more expansive sense not as the educated man of letters, but as any 
actor who is a conscious interlocutor in cultural, social, and political debates. 
Taking such an understanding as a starting point, this paper seeks to present 
an interpretation of the interrelation of philosophy of language and aesthetic 
judgment in the Quaderni del carcere, developed as a further iteration of 
Gramsci’s own reading of Marx and his unique intervention in the 
philosophical debates surrounding the relationship between base and 
superstructure.  
While I am not directly addressing here the subset of topics that Gramsci 
explicitly links to the concept of ideology, I would like to suggest that an 
important companion to folklore, religion, common sense, and philosophy 
is the broader question of aesthetic judgment and its relationship to the 
categories of religion and philosophy, as mediated by Gramsci’s formation 
as a student of linguistics and philosophy of language. I maintain that we 




need to delve into Gramsci’s philosophical orientation, both in the 
traditional western sense of academic philosophy and in the more extensive 
sense of an everyday worldview, and the ties it has to his formative 
background in linguistics and his attendant understanding of literary 
criticism and aesthetic judgment. In working up this connection, my goal is 
to draw out some of the implications of the “cultural turn” in Marxist 
theory that Gramsci’s thought represents. Therefore, this paper has two 
major objectives: in the first place, to develop the linkage between religion 
and philosophy in the expanded understanding of ideology and 
superstructure, and, secondly, to tie this specific concept to the possibilities 
of a radically new mode of engaging in aesthetic and cultural critique.  
As a Marxist engaged in a critical revision of interpretations of Marx, 
Gramsci identifies a previously unacknowledged problem in Marxian theory: 
that of how, precisely, to change things as they are, given that such empirical 
change comes about due to the elaboration of a scientific, theoretical 
explanation for the economic and social order1. Gramsci’s famous 
philosophy of praxis is formulated in response to the interrelated problems 
of theoretical scientificity, the canon of nineteenth-century philosophical 
idealism, and practical political concerns. Thomas Nemeth has termed the 
specific problem that Gramsci addresses the «impasse of objectivism», 
which emerges from the nexus of positivism, materialism, and skepticism, in 
which one possible outcome is a lapse into Humean psychologism2. In 
looking to ground one’s observations of the world objectively, one must 
confront the issue of subjective perception and the closed loop of the 
privileged subject. Instead of allowing for a seemingly infinite chain of 
linked contingencies, Gramsci chooses to foreground an «inquiry into the 
possibility of objective knowledge» itself3. 
Gramsci engages in a critique of any metaphysical foundation for 
materialism, which is the charge he levies against Engels and Bukharin, 
                                                     
1 Here I am re-casting what is otherwise well-understood, by Gramsci himself as 
well as the scholarship, as the Gramscian focus on superstructure in Marxist theory. 
For a comprehensive introduction to and overview of Gramsci’s relationship to 
Marx, see vol. 2 of MARTIN 2002. For interpretations of Gramsci’s specific notion 
of materialism, see FINOCCHIARO 1988; FROSINI 2010; MORERA 1990; NEMETH 
1980.  
2  NEMETH 1980, p. 104. 
3  Ibidem. 




against a proper understanding of Marx4. As Gramsci writes in Notebook 
11: 
 
«si chiamò materialismo ogni dottrina filosofica che escludesse la trascendenza 
dal dominio del pensiero e quindi in realtà tutto il panteismo e l’immanentismo non 
solo, ma si chiamò materialismo anche ogni atteggiamento pratico ispirato al 
realismo politico, che si opponesse cioè a certe correnti deteriori del romanticismo 
politico, come le dottrine di Mazzini popolarizzate e che non parlavano che di 
“missioni” e di “ideali” e di altre consimili nebulosità vaghe e astrattezze 
sentimentalistiche»5.  
 
Under the umbrella of such a definition, «the whole of German Idealism 
can, thus, be called a materialism in this sense. Crude metaphysical 
materialism is closer to popular religions and common sense than to the 
philosophy of praxis»6. 
Given that Gramsci, following Marx, argues against any transcendent 
order (or notion of god), what remains is the subject, invested with the 
ability to transform material reality based on an understanding of history, 
philosophy, science, and economics. The difficulty, which Gramsci outlines 
in the Quaderni entries dedicated to the rubrics of La realtà del mondo esterno 
and L’oggettività del reale7, is to avoid «la conversione del materialismo storico 
nell’idealismo o addirittura nella religione»8. This is the distinction between a 
                                                     
4 It is important to understand what Nemeth underscores: «…that early Italian Marx 
scholarship, at least since Croce’s first writings, came down heavily against imputing 
a materialist world-view to Marx. This rejection of materialism, understood in the 
traditional metaphysical sense, stood in sharp contrast to the efforts of many 
Marxists elsewhere and even to Labriola himself» (NEMETH 1980, p. 98).  
5 QC 11, § 16, pp. 1408-1409; «every philosophical doctrine that excludes 
transcendence from the realm of thought is called materialism; therefore, in reality, 
not just pantheism and immanentism count as materialisms, but also every practical 
attitude inspired by political realism, which places itself in opposition to certain 
second-rate forms of political romanticism, like the popularized ideas of Mazzini, 
and those that do not speak of ‘missions’ or ‘ideals’ and other similar, related vague 
concepts and sentimental abstractions» (author’s own translation).  
6 NEMETH 1980, p. 102 
7 Those entries are the following: QC 4, § 1, § 37, § 41, § 43, § 47; QC 7, § 47; QC 8, 
§ 153, § 177, § 215, § 217; QC 10, § 6, § 40, § 42, § 46; QC 11, § 17, § 20, § 34, § 37, 
§ 57, § 60, § 65; QC 16, § 12; QC 17  § 18. For reasons of brevity and clarity, I am 
unable to present here an in-depth analysis of each of these notes.  
8 QC 4 § 43, p. 469; «the conversion of historical materialism into idealism or even 
into religion» (GRAMSCI 1996, p. 193). 




properly historical materialism (which is the philosophy of praxis), and a 
metaphysical materialism. Such an error occurs, Gramsci asserts in QC 4, § 
41 under the heading La scienza, through the assumption of total objectivity 
separated, and abstracted, from human perception or understanding9. In the 
definition of experimental and theoretical science presented in this note, 
Gramsci writes: 
 
«mi pare che sia un errore domandare alla scienza come tale la prova 
dell’obbiettività del reale: questa è una concezione del mondo, una filosofia, non un 
dato scientifico. Cosa può dare la scienza in questa direzione? La scienza fa una 
selezione tra le sensazioni, tra gli elementi primordiali della conoscenza: considera 
certe sensazioni come transitorie, come apparenti, come fallaci perché dipendono 
unicamente da speciali condizioni individuali e certe altre come durature, come 
permanenti, come superiori alle condizioni speciali individuali. Il lavoro scientifico 
ha due aspetti: uno che instancabilmente rettifica il metodo della conoscenza, e 
rettifica o rafforza gli organi delle sensazioni e l’altro che applica questo metodo e 
questi organi sempre più perfetti a stabilire ciò che di necessario esiste nelle 
sensazioni da ciò che è arbitrario e transitorio. Si stabilisce così ciò che è comune a 
tutti gli uomini, ciò che tutti gli uomini possono vedere e sentire nello stesso modo, 
purché essi abbiano osservato le condizioni scientifiche di accertamento. In quanto 
si stabilisce questa oggettività, la si afferma: si afferma l’essere in sé, l’essere 
permanente, l’essere comune a tutti gli uomini, l’essere indipendente da ogni punto 
di vista che sia meramente particolare. Ma anche questa è una concezione del 
mondo, è un’ideologia»10. 
                                                     
9 QC 4, § 41, pp. 466-67 
10 QC 4, § 41, pp. 466-467; «I believe it is a mistake to demand that science as such 
prove the objectivity of the real; that is a conception of the world, a philosophy, not 
a scientific datum. What can science provide along these lines? Science makes a 
selection from among sense perceptions, from among the most basic elements of 
knowledge; it regards certain sensations as fleeting, illusory, and deceptive because 
they depend solely on special individual circumstances, and it regards other 
sensations as lasting, permanent and transcending special individual conditions. 
Scientific work has two facets: one is tirelessly rectifying the method of knowledge, 
and it rectifies or reinforces the organs of sensation; the other applies this method 
and these increasingly refined organs in order to establish what is fundamentally 
present in the sensations as opposed to what is arbitrary and transitory. Thus one 
establishes what is common to all humans, what all humans can see and feel in the 
same manner, provided they adhere to the scientific conditions of verification. 
Insofar as this objectivity is established, it is affirmed. What is affirmed is being in 
itself, permanent being, the being that is common to all humans, being that is 




Moreover, the belief in objective reality and in the existence of the 
external world, is a religious, Catholic belief, in addition to one that belongs 
to a scientific, rational worldview11. As Esteve Morera points out, Gramsci’s 
concern is with a theory that «posited a world made by a divine will superior 
to any human will, and hence unchangeable by human beings»12. Given, 
however, that Gramsci is critical of any presumptions to objective “proof”, 
how does he avoid becoming himself a philosophical idealist, in the crudest 
sense of the term13? 
As Fabio Frosini explains, it is through a critique of Marx’s notion of 
ideology and, therefore, superstructure14. Frosini describes Marx’s position, 
as rendered in Gramsci’s translation of the 1859 Prefazione to Il materialismo 
storico: 
 
                                                     
 
independent of all particular viewpoints. But this, too, is a conception of the world; 
it is an ideology» (GRAMSCI 1996, pp. 189-190).  
11 QC, pp. 894, 1075-1076, 1078-1079, 1333, 1412-1415, 1419, 1486, 1491-1492; 
QC, pp. 1920-1921. Each reference repeats the same idea, stated most clearly in QC 
11, § 17: «Infatti questa credenza [nella realtà del mondo esterno] è di origine 
religiosa, anche se chi vi partecipa è religiosamente indifferente. Poiché tutte le 
religioni hanno insegnato o insegnano che il mondo, la natura, l’universo è stato 
creato da dio prima della creazione dell’uomo e quindi l’uomo ha trovato il mondo 
già bell’e pronto, catalogato e definito una volta per sempre, questa credenza è 
diventata un dato ferreo del ‘senso comune’ e vive con la stessa saldezza anche se il 
sentimento religioso è spento o sopito» (p. 1412); «in fact, this belief [in the reality 
of the external world] has a religious origin, even if those who share it are 
indifferent to religion. Because all religions have taught and teach that the world, 
nature, and the universe were created by god prior to the creation of man and, 
therefore, man found the world readymade, categorized, and defined once and for 
all, this belief has become an ironclad fact of ‘common sense’, and survives with the 
same strength even if religious feeling is worn out or dormant» (author’s own 
translation). 
12 MORERA 1990, p. 42 
13 In Nemeth’s terms: «The materialists are those who assert the primacy of matter; 
the idealists those who give mind or spirit as primary» (NEMETH 1980, p. 99). The 
notion of mind, or spirit, here encompasses the realm of ideas.  
14  As articulated by Marx in The German Ideology, the Theses on Feuerbach, the 
preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Wage Labour and Capital, 
and the Manifesto of the Communist Party (FROSINI 2010, p. 77).  




«whatever the status of that kind of science [a science which “permits 
observation of the place in which superstructural forms ‘take root’”] and its 
ideological character, according to Marx, it is clear that in [Gramsci’s] expository 
strategy of this Marxian passage, the question is not in the slightest relative to 
“ideological forms” and their possible status, but, rather, relative to the necessity of 
excluding them insofar as they are judgments on events, since this criterion should be 
found in the scientific study of the “real base”»15. 
 
Gramsci’s critique is of the theoretical and philosophical basis for the 
science of knowledge, which necessarily excludes the non-economic and 
strictly political concerns of “ideology”. Such a scientific basis is dependent 
on, as described above, the objective existence of phenomena, which remain 
unchanged by human perception.  
The heart of the problem lies in a correspondence theory of truth, or 
meaning, which is pointed out by Nemeth in his summary of Bukharin’s 
philosophical positions16. As Bukharin writes: «cognition, considered 
historically, is the more and more adequate reflection of objective reality. The 
fundamental criterion of the correctness of cognition is therefore the 
criterion of its adequateness, its degree of correspondence to objective reality»17. 
We can understand the problem of correspondence, then, as the problem of 
the gap between theory and practice, which is also the “impasse of 
objectivism” referred to above. The solution to such an impasse is offered 
by a new notion of praxis, which Gramsci substitutes for vulgar concepts of 
                                                     
15 FROSINI 2010, p. 78; author’s own translation.  As Frosini writes, «[praxis, for 
Marx]…means that ideological forms are forms of real knowledge, insofar as they are 
the ‘correspondents’ of practice. As this ‘correspondence’ is understood, it is 
obviously a question of extraordinary importance, which can be correctly 
approached [by Gramsci] only by emphasizing the fact that actions are not facts, or 
‘things’, but antagonistic relationships. They are antagonistic relationships not 
between ready-made subjects, but between ‘forces’ (therefore ‘relationships among 
forces’), which constitute themselves in and through their relation to one another. 
They constitute themselves through conflict, thanks to the ideological 
‘representation’ of themselves and of their relationship to other forces…the 
Gramscian claim of the ‘gnoseological value’ of ideologies in light of the Theses on 
Feuerbach: ideologies constitute the truth of a political position made up of different 
forces, making these into ‘classes’ in possession of different amounts of ‘power,’ 
held with respect to all other forces in a historically active manner» (FROSINI 2010, 
pp. 79-80; author’s own translation). 
16 NEMETH 1980, p. 101. 
17 Quoted in NEMETH 1980, p. 101. 




historical materialism. He does so on the basis of an emphasis on individual 
and collective human action, which is situated in history and on the non-
metaphysical ground of, in Nemeth’s terms, continued exploration and 
analysis of what makes objective knowledge as such possible in the first 
place, an operation which necessarily privileges the cultural and social.  
Furthermore, this idea of praxis is predicated on Gramsci’s 
understanding of linguistic theory and language change, and is shored up by 
his criticism of Bertrand Russell and Benedetto Croce18 in the Quaderni. It 
should also be said outright that my focus on Russell and Croce takes space 
away from a crucial consideration when examining Gramsci’s criticisms of 
Croce and the literary: the opposing model of Francesco De Sanctis19. That 
being said, the examples of Russell and Croce are paradigmatic because they 
connect Gramsci’s philosophical objection to both scientific materialism 
and logical positivism with the related turn towards symbolic logic and 
logical (as opposed to natural) language. In the history of western 
philosophy and in Gramsci’s own thought, these concepts are intimately 
related20. Gramsci’s training as a linguist21 puts him in a unique position in 
                                                     
18 The scholarship on Gramsci and Croce is quite extensive, and, as such, there is 
not space here to fully consider the (contested) relation between the two thinkers. 
However, I take the position that, while certainly indebted to Croce, Gramsci does 
succeed in articulating an alternative philosophy. For an introduction to the Croce-
Gramsci nexus, see FINOCCHIARO 1979; GALASSO 1969; KAHN 1985; and META 
2011. 
19 See GERRATANA 1952.  
20 There is not space for such a discussion here, but the relationship continues even 
after western philosophy moves on from an undifferentiated interest in developing 
an ideal symbolic logic. This is largely due to the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
particularly his later thought in the Philosophical Investigations. Multiple scholars have 
advanced the fascinating argument that the mid-life change in Wittgenstein’s 
thought (to summarize very generally and partially, the change is in the development 
of the concept of “language games” and the idea of “meaning as use”) is due to the 
influence of Gramsci, via Piero Sraffa, who was a friend of Wittgenstein’s while 
both were at Cambridge, and who remained in contact with Gramsci while he was 
in prison. See SEN 2003; DAVIS 2002; and AQUECI 2013. The heritage of the 
“linguistic turn” Russell and Wittgenstein represent, and its relation to philosophical 
Marxism and politics in general, is further worked out in the thought of the Bakhtin 
circle, the Frankfurt School, and the poststructuralists; there is significant overlap 
with Gramsci’s thinking and much to be discussed and understood. See HOLUB 
1992; IVES 2004a; and LANDY 1994. 




regards to these philosophical questions and to the emergence of language 
as a conceptual battleground. The work of foregrounding the centrality of 
Gramsci’s ideas about language22 in his overall thought has been furthered 
by Derek Boothman, Alessandro Carlucci, Neils Helsloot, Peter Ives, Luigi 
Rosiello, and Giancarlo Schirru23. Ives points out the two major schools of 
linguistic thought at the beginning of the twentieth century in Italy: the 
positivist Neo-grammarians, and the Idealist school, represented in Italy by 
Benedetto Croce24. Gramsci was critical of both camps, following Bartoli, 
and echoing his later views on positivism in general and on the possibility of 
Esperanto (which was also a criticism of the socialist approach to cultural 
issues, also at play in his pre-prison approach to more general literary 
movements)25. His own view can be summarized as the following: language 
is embedded in its specific cultural and socio-historical context, language 
change occurs due to conflict between competing linguistic forms, and 
language is a shared structure that exceeds the speech of specific 
individuals26. 
Throughout the Quaderni del carcere, Gramsci only cites Russell twice, but 
in a paradigmatic way27. At the end of QC 4, § 41, he writes: 
 
«ricordo una affermazione di Bertrando Russell: si può immaginare sulla terra, 
anche senza l’uomo, non Glasgow e Londra, ma due punti della superficie della 
terra uno più a Nord e uno più a Sud (o qualcosa di simile: è contenuta in un 
libretto filosofico di Russell tradotto in una collezioncina Sonzogno di carattere 
scientifico). Ma senza l’uomo come significherebbe Nord e Sud, e “punto”, e 
                                                     
 
21 Gramsci studied with the linguist Matteo Bartoli, a follower of the nineteenth-
century linguist Graziadio Isaia Ascoli, at the University of Turin. Bartoli was 
engaged in a polemic with the German neo-grammarian school, which took a 
positivist approach to historical comparative linguistics. See the chapter “Bartoli’s 
polemic against the Neogrammarians” in IVES 2004b, pp. 47-54.  
22 For an overview of Gramsci’s theory of language and linguistics, see DE MAURO 
1991, pp. 135-44.  
23 BOOTHMAN 2004; CARLUCCI 2013; HELSLOOT 1989; IVES 2004b; ROSSIELLO 
1986; SCHIRRU 1998, 2008a; 2008b; 2010; 2011; 2016. 
24 IVES 2004b, pp.  43-55. 
25 Ivi, pp. 47, 55. 
26 See IVES 2004b, p. 55 for a more detailed discussion of Gramsci’s specific views 
on language.  
27 Russell and his example are cited again (with Edinburgh instead of Glasgow) in 
QC 11, § 20, pp. 1418-1419.  




“superficie”, e “terra”? Non sono queste espressioni necessariamente legate 
all’uomo, ai suoi bisogni, alla sua vita, alla sua attività? Senza l’attività dell’uomo, 
creatrice di tutti i valori anche scientifici, cosa sarebbe l’“oggettività”? Un caos, cioè 
niente, il vuoto, se pure così si può dire, perché realmente se si immagina che non 
esista l’uomo, non si può immaginare la lingua e il pensiero. Per il materialismo 
storico non si può staccare il pensare dall’essere, l’uomo dalla natura, l’attività 
(storia) dalla materia, il soggetto dall’oggetto: se si fa questo distacco si cade nel 
chiacchiericcio, nell’astrazione senza senso»28. 
 
To not separate “thinking” from “being”, then, one must look at the 
shared aspects of subjective reality, which are culture, worldview, and, of 
course, language. It is thus not an accident that Russell is Gramsci’s 
example, even though he is not here explicitly referring to Russell’s 
investment in the creation (or discovery) of an ideal, logical language29. 
Rather than a notion of objectivity that requires the objective to be outside 
of, and indifferent to, human perception, Gramsci proposes an idea of 
consensus via recourse to an “objective” reality, in the sense of 
understanding reality as the result of a relation between a subject and her 
objects of thought and perception. Where objects are held in common by 
different individual subjects, Gramsci’s interest is in understanding how they 
are inflected and transformed by different circumstances and conditions, 
and vice versa. This understanding is not only his insistence on the broader 
importance of culture, and its reciprocal relationship to the conditions of 
                                                     
28 QC 4, § 41, pp. 466-467; «I remember a statement by Bertrand Russell: one can 
imagine on earth, even in the absence of man, not Glasgow or London but two 
points on the surface of the earth, one of which is farther north and the other 
farther south (or something similar; it is to be found in a short philosophical work 
by Russell, translated as part of the small scientific series published by Sonzogno). 
But, in the absence of man, what would be the meaning of north and south, and 
‘point’, and ‘surface’, and ‘earth’? Aren’t these words necessarily linked to man, his 
needs, his life, his activity? In the absence of human activity, which creates all 
values, including scientific values, what would ‘objectivity’ be? Chaos, or 
nothingness, emptiness—if one can even say this much, for if one were really to 
imagine that man did not exist, it would be impossible to imagine language and 
thought. In historical materialism thought cannot be separated from being, man 
from nature, activity (history) from matter, subject from object: such a separation 
would be a fall into empty talk, meaningless abstraction» (GRAMSCI 1996, p. 190).  
29 For a concise summary of Russell’s philosophy as regards sense data, perception, 
and subjectivity, and the implications therein for artistic representation, see 
BANFIELD 1990.  




materiality, but springs from and coincides with his views on language and 
linguistic meaning. 
This becomes even clearer in his rebuttal to Croce’s famous 1905 essay 
on linguistic sense, nonsense, and reference, “questa tavola rotonda è 
quadrata,” which appears in the final Quaderno 29, dedicated to a 
consideration of grammar. Gramsci argues that Croce is wrong, even on his 
own terms, in concurring with the German linguist Heymann Steinthal that 
the titular proposition is grammatical but illogical and, furthermore, ugly30. 
Gramsci’s claim is that the proposition, even for Croce, has an expressive 
function31 and can be justified on those grounds. The same can be said for 
grammatically incorrect statements: «In realtà tutto ciò che (non) è 
“grammaticalmente esatto” può anche essere giustificato dal punto di vista 
estetico, logico, ecc., se lo si vede non nella particolare logica, ecc., 
dell’espressione immediatamente meccanica, ma come elemento di una 
rappresentazione più vasta e comprensiva»32. This observation points to the 
importance of the example, since it presents us with the fundamental 
question, «Cosa è la grammatica? [What is grammar?]». As Gramsci explains,  
 
«la grammatica è “storia” o “documento storico”: essa è la “fotografia” di una 
fase determinata di un linguaggio nazionale (collettivo) [formatosi storicamente e in 
continuo sviluppo], o i tratti fondamentali di una fotografia. La quistione pratica 
può essere: a che fine tale fotografia? Per fare la storia di un aspetto della civiltà o 
per modificare un aspetto della civiltà? La pretesa del Croce porterebbe a negare 
ogni valore a un quadro rappresentante [tra l’altro] una…sirena, per esempio, cioè si 
                                                     
30 Gramsci’s response appears in QC 29, § 1, pp. 2341-342. It appears in translation 
as Croce’s Essay “This Round Table is Square”, in GRAMSCI 1985, pp. 179-80. 
31 Croce’s position on language is glossed by Ives: «…language is understood purely 
as expression. It is just the conglomeration of individual speech acts which are each 
aesthetic acts of the speaker…From such a perspective, Croce and his linguistic 
followers argue that the aesthetic acts that constitute language are never themselves 
repeatable. To argue otherwise, according to Croce, would be to falsely separate the 
content of an expression from the act of speaking» (IVES 2004b, pp. 53-54).  
32 QC 29, § 1, p. 2341; «in reality, everything that is [not] ‘grammatically correct’ can 
also be justified from the aesthetic and logical point of view if one sees it as an 
element of a broader and a more comprehensive representation, rather than within 
the particular logic of the immediately mechanical expression» (GRAMSCI 1985, p.  
179).  




dovrebbe concludere che ogni proposizione deve corrispondere al vero o al verosimile, 
ecc»33. 
 
This understanding of grammar accords with Gramsci’s views as a 
university student, and points away from a correspondence theory of 
meaning, whether that correspondence is with an objective external reality, 
as in the scientific paradigm of Neogrammarian linguistics, or with a 
subjective internal expression, as in Crocean idealism. Meaning, or truth, is 
not a matter of verisimilitude, nor can it be abstracted a-historically through 
an objective analysis. This is not only a version of Gramsci’s reformulation 
of the Marxian superstructure, against positivism, but it also has profound 
implications for his views on literary criticism and aesthetics.  
Given that, as Giuseppe Petronio reminds us, «Antonio Gramsci non fu 
certo un critico letterario nel senso preciso, tecnico, della parola»34 it is 
tempting to reduce Gramsci’s thinking to what is now, from the vantage 
point of the early twenty-first century, an easily recognizable cultural and 
sociological turn. Letterio Cassata, in his 1969 survey of scholarship on 
Gramsci’s literary criticism, points this out as the major theoretical 
stumbling block to overcome when attempting to conceptualize a 
Gramscian view on matters of literary aesthetics35. However, Gramsci 
himself identifies, and attempts to think through, this problem, which he 
recognizes in the Crocean-idealist “unity” of form and content, where form 
is initially privileged for its ability to subsume, and therefore transcend, 
content36. As Nikša Stipčević explains,  
 
                                                     
33 QC 29, § 1, pp. 2341-342; «grammar is “history” or “a historical document”: it is 
the “photograph” of a given phase of a national (collective) language that has been 
formed historically and is continuously developing, or the fundamental traits of a 
photograph. The practical question might be: what is the purpose of such a 
photograph? To record the history of an aspect of civilization or to modify an 
aspect of civilization? Croce’s claim would lead one to deny that a picture depicting, 
among other things, a…siren, for example, has any value. In other words, one 
would have to conclude that every proposition must correspond to the true or to 
verisimilitude» (GRAMSCI 1985, pp. 179-180).   
34 «Antonio Gramsci was certainly not a literary critic in the strict sense of the 
word» (author’s own translation), PETRONIO 1969, pp. 287-90.  
35 CASSATA 1969, pp. 215-221.  
36 For a skeptical interpretation of Gramsci’s views, see the chapter “Gramsci e la 
letteratura,” in GUGLIELMI 1976, pp. 127-56. 




«already in the first edition of his Aesthetics, Croce outlines that “the aesthetic act 
is, therefore, form and nothing other than form”, so that in the aesthetic 
transposition, the impression (content) and expression (form) combine into a single 
entity. Later, Croce will return more than once to the dualism of “form and 
content” and develop and dissolve it with ever more coherence, therefore getting 
ever closer to a dialectical resolution, in such a way that the Marxist Gramsci will be 
able to extrapolate from this system and give it materialist significance»37. 
 
The only notebook dedicated entirely to “Critica letteraria” is Notebook 
23, while the most important note on the topic is found in QC 15, § 38, 
where Gramsci discusses the view that «l’arte è arte e non propaganda 
politica “voluta” e proposta»38. He is attempting to reconcile this idea with 
his own notion of the need for «[la] formazione di determinate correnti 
culturali che siano il riflesso del loro tempo e che contribuiscano a 
rafforzare determinate correnti politiche»39. For Gramsci, these two ideas 
are not incompatible since, as he describes in QC 4, § 36, the criteria for 
literary judgment include not just complete originality of fused content and 
form, but also new ideas, structures, and organizational principles40. This 
accords with what he writes in QC 15, § 38: 
 
«posto il principio che nell’opera d’arte sia solamente da ricercare il carattere 
artistico, non è per nulla esclusa la ricerca di quale massa di sentimenti, di quale 
atteggiamento verso la vita circoli nell’opera d’arte stessa. Anzi ciò che sia ammesso 
dalle moderne correnti estetiche si vede nel De Sanctis e nello stesso Croce. Ciò che 
si esclude è che un’opera sia bella per il suo contenuto morale e politico e non già 
                                                     
37 STIPČEVIĆ, 1968, pp. 26-27, author’s own translation. To wit: «In Gramsci, the 
Crocean aesthetic equation essentially transforms. He accepts Croce’s point about 
the reciprocal dependence of form and content, so that the form also becomes the 
content of the work, and the content also its own form. In Gramsci, however, these 
two concepts have a completely different value. While, for Croce, leaving aside the 
eventual changes to this relationship, content is, in the first place, ‘impression’ (or, 
later, ‘sentiment’) and form ‘expression.’ Gramsci liberates these two united 
concepts from the abstract yoke of intuitive aesthetics, uncoupling them from an a 
priori synthesis and giving them a real materialist significance» (STIPČEVIĆ 1968, p. 
28; author’s own translation).  
38 QC 15, § 38, p. 1793; «art is art and not political propaganda purposefully 
designed» (author’s own translation).  
39 QC 15, § 38, p. 1793; «the formation of specific cultural currents that could be the 
reflection of their time, and could contribute to reinforcing specific political trends» 
(author’s own translation). 
40 QC 4, § 36, p. 454. 




per la sua forma in cui il contenuto astratto si è fuso e immedesimato. Ancora si 
ricerca se un’opera d’arte non sia fallita perché l’autore sia stato deviato da 
preoccupazioni pratiche esteriori, cioè posticce e insincere. Questo pare il punto 
cruciale della polemica: Tizio “vuole” esprimere artificiosamente un determinato 
contenuto e non fa opera d’arte»41. 
 
Art that aims only to express a pre-determined “lesson” or ideology, in 
the crude sense of the term, is almost certainly ugly, or bad, since distraction 
from guiding formal, aesthetic principles can only detract from the quality of 
the combined impression-expression. However, this is a normative 
aesthetics based on discarding works that attempt to privilege content over 
form, which, ironically, ends up itself privileging form over content. 
Gramsci is skeptical of this approach, since it does not get any closer to 
understanding the aesthetic nature of the work, which can, and does, include 
the world-view and attitude towards life operative therein. 
The separation of political content from aesthetic form also leads to a 
type of criticism that allows for dismissal of a work of art not on aesthetic, 
but on vulgar ideological grounds. Gramsci comes down harshly on this: 
 
«il critico politico dunque denuncia Tizio, non come artista, ma come 
“opportunista politico”. Che l’uomo politico faccia una pressione perché l’arte del 
suo tempo esprima un determinato mondo culturale è attività politica, non di critica 
artistica: se il mondo culturale per il quale si lotta è un fatto vivente e necessario, la 
sua espansività sarà irresistibile, esso troverà i suoi artisti. Ma se nonostante la 
pressione, questa irresistibilità non si vede e non opera, significa che si trattava di un 
mondo fittizio e posticcio, elucubrazione cartacea di mediocri che si lamentano che 
gli uomini di maggior statura non siano d’accordo con loro. Lo stesso modo di 
porre la quistione può essere un indizio della saldezza di un tal mondo morale e 
culturale: e infatti il così detto “calligrafismo” non è che la difesa di piccoli artisti 
che opportunisticamente affermano certi principii ma si sentono incapaci di 
                                                     
41 QC 15, § 38, p. 1793; «the principle that, in a work of art, one is only interested in 
artistic character, in no way excludes the study of the nodes of feeling, and of the 
attitudes toward life, that circulate in the work itself. In fact, this is what is already 
admitted by the modern ideas of aesthetics that one sees in [Francesco] De Sanctis 
and [Benedetto] Croce. What is excluded is that a work is beautiful for its political 
and moral content and not for its form, into which the abstract content has been 
fused and submerged. One still asks if a work of art fails because its author has been 
derailed by external, practical preoccupations, that is, ones that are false and 
insincere. This seems to be the heart of the polemic: John Doe ‘wants’ to artificially 
express a specific content and therefore does not make art» (author’s own 
translation).  




esprimerli artisticamente cioè nell’attività loro propria e allora vaneggiano di pura 
forma che è il suo stesso contenuto ecc. ecc. Il principio formale della distinzione 
delle categorie spirituali e della loro unità di circolazione, pur nel suo astrattismo, 
permette di cogliere la realtà effettuale e di criticare l’arbitrarietà e la pseudovita di 
chi non vuole giocare a carte scoperte o è semplicemente un mediocre che è stato 
dal caso posto a un luogo di comando»42. 
 
That Gramsci is not advocating for the imposition of specific, politicized 
content (or form) in art is significant because, for him, it has a theoretical 
basis. As he writes, neither the political nor the art critic judges the “political 
art work” on aesthetic grounds: both condemn it, in different ways, for its 
“ideological” content. The possibility that the world Gramsci is fighting for 
will not, of its own accord, find adequate artistic expression must be left 
open; to think otherwise is to fall into the metaphysical materialist trap. 
While it is true that Gramsci does not (and perhaps cannot) consider 
form and content as completely inseparable, he certainly goes as far as 
possible in that direction, in his commentary throughout the Quaderni del 
carcere on various literary figures and works, by analyzing both of these 
aspects and fitting them into the larger panorama of other aesthetic 
movements and trends, and the social-political moment. That he is able to 
do this is a result, as I have described, of what Frosini has termed the 
“immanentist” approach to classical philosophical materialism, also known 
as the philosophy of praxis, in which he critiques both positivism and 
                                                     
42 QC 15, § 38, p. 1794; «the political critic, therefore, denounces Tizio, not as an 
artist, but as a ‘political opportunist’. That the politician exerts pressure so that the 
art of her time expresses a determined cultural world is political activity, not 
aesthetic criticism: if the cultural world for which we fight is a living and necessary 
fact, its expansiveness will be irresistible and it will find its artists. But if, 
notwithstanding such pressure, this irresistibility does not occur and is not 
operative, it means that we are dealing with a fictive and false world, a cardboard 
projection by mediocre people who complain that people of greater status do not 
agree with them. The way of posing the question can itself be an indication of the 
strength of such a moral and cultural world: and, in fact, so-called ‘calligraphism’ is 
not other than the self-defense of lesser artists who opportunistically affirm certain 
principles but feel themselves incapable of expressing them artistically, in their very 
own sphere of activity. As a result, they rave about pure form which is its own 
content, etc, etc. The formal principle of the distinction between spiritual categories 
and the unity of their circulation, in its very abstraction, permits the capturing of 
reality and the criticism of arbitrariness and a kind of pseudo-life by those who do 
not want to put their cards on the table, or who are simply mediocre people who 
occupy a position of power simply by chance» (author’s own translation).  




idealism. This is a version of the reformulation of the concept of ideology, 
and it is consistent with, and indebted to, his views on language and 
linguistic meaning. For Gramsci, language is reducible to neither 
objectifiable, external laws of grammar and correctness, nor to the willed 
expression of a single mind or spirit. These views are not actually critically 
opposed, since the epistemological question of scientific objectivity leads 
directly to the problem of subjective psychologism. Therefore, it is not 
possible to look at literature as the apex of correct, grammatical expression 
by an individual who embodies the values of cosmopolitan learning and 
intellectual endeavors. This approach is the traditional one taken to the 
history of Italian literature (and, most broadly, to the general canon of 
western literature), and to the broad cultural, nationalistic relevance of 
literature itself.   
Gramsci’s take on literary criticism is a hugely significant conceptual 
move, in the scope of twentieth-century philosophy and critical theory, and 
one that has been largely overshadowed by the greater critical emphasis on 
totalizing structures and systems. On the most basic level, Gramsci is 
arguing that language, and linguistic meaning, have both subjective and 
objective valences that cannot be reduced to theories of reference or 
correspondence. This is a view of language as immanent and embodied 
“object”, or matter, that is somehow able to convey its own reality through 
the speaking, or writing, subject. This view also implies that the modulation 
of individual subjective reality has concrete, systematic political effects, and 
that this is one of the arguments for understanding acts of language, and 
works of literature and culture, from within this framework. As such, the 
kind of historical materialism at work in Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis has 
consequences for, and originates in, an understanding of language and 
linguistic meaning that rejects any correspondence theory of meaning. 
Consequently, aesthetic judgment, including literary criticism, maintains a 
unity of form and content while rejecting facile attempts to reduce the 
global meaning of a “political” work of art to its ideological content, where 
ideology is understood in the sense of a series of theoretical propositions 
about the world, which reside in the realm of traditional Marxist 
superstructure. In this view, all works of art are political in that they 
participate, and take place, in the empirical world. Instead of following a line 
of thinking that would perpetuate a separation of the empirical and 
intellectual realms, Gramsci’s expanded notion of ideology, wherein there is 
no recourse to either a scientific objectivity or a relativistic emphasis on 
subjectivity, guides his views. Here, as elsewhere in the Gramsci of the 




Quaderni del carcere, comprehending the concept of ideology requires a mutual 
comprehension of the power structures that regulate not only material and 
economic conditions, but also the circumstances most intimately related to 
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